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Jones v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 53 (July 3, 2014)1 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: RIGHT TO ACCESS THE COURT 
Summary 
The Court determined (1) whether a criminal defendant’s access to the courts can be 
restricted by the district court when he or she is challenging a judgment of conviction and 
sentence or the computation of time served under a judgment of conviction; and (2) whether 
there is an established approach courts should take when restricting the access.  
Disposition 
District courts have the authority to restrict a litigant’s right to access the court. However, 
courts must balance competing interests by following the four-step analysis set forth in Jordan 
when determining whether to permanently restrict a litigant’s right to access the court.  
Factual and Procedural History 
Darryl Jones was convicted for several crimes and sentenced to a total of approximately 
51 to 134 years in prison. On appeal, the district court reversed the judgment on some counts and 
affirmed the remaining counts. Subsequently, Jones, representing himself, filed a timely post-
conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his judgment of conviction and 
sentence. Jones also filed amendments to his petition, a motion for the production of documents, 
and a motion to extend his prison copy limit. The State then filed a consolidated opposition and a 
request for vexatious litigant determination. The district court referred Jones to the chief judge 
for an official determination, and, later, a cursory order was entered denying all of Jones’s 
motions and determining that he was a vexatious litigant. The order restricted Jones’s ability to 
file further documents in the district court and stated “that all future filings by defendant in this 
matter are referred to the chief judge for review and approval before they may come before this 
Department.” The order also stated that Jones’s filings were not made in good faith and were 
filed for the sole purpose of harassing the State and district court. At the hearing, Jones was not 
represented by counsel, nor was he present; he later filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to 
challenge the district court’s order.  
Discussion 
Under Nevada law, courts can permanently restrict a litigant’s right to access the courts 
by using approved procedures to help determine whether to restrict a litigant’s access to the 
courts and to narrowly tailor the restrictive order.2 However, courts may not impose a complete 
ban on filings by an indigent proper person litigant if the ban prevents the litigant from 
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proceeding in original civil actions and criminal cases that sufficiently implicate a fundamental 
right.3  
Furthermore, other jurisdictions have concluded that courts may issue restrictive orders to 
curb repetitive or abusive activities by litigants who are challenging a judgment of conviction 
and that such restrictions are necessary and prudent to curb conduct that would impair court 
functions and the rights of other litigants.  In order to preserve judicial resources and curb 
vexatious behavior, this Court concludes, “that the district courts have inherent authority to issue 
orders that restrict a litigant’s filings that challenge a judgment of conviction and sentence if the 
court determines that the litigant is vexatious.” Because the right to access courts is an important 
constitutional concern, courts must carefully balance competing interests to determine if the 
restrictive order would limit a litigant’s access to the courts in order to challenge a judgment of 
conviction and sentence.  
In order to balance the competing interests, district courts should use the following four-
step analysis as stated in Jordan: (1) a litigant must be provided reasonable notice of and an 
opportunity to oppose a restrictive order’s issuance; (2) the court must create an adequate record 
for review, including a list of the petitions or motions, or an explanation of the reasons that led to 
the restrictive order and consider whether there are other standard remedies available and 
adequate to curb the abusive litigation; (3) the court must make substantive findings that the 
litigant’s actions are frivolous or harassing in nature; and (4) “the order must be narrowly drawn 
to address the specific problems encountered and must set an appropriate standard by which any 
future filings will be measured.” 
Here, the district court failed to provide Jones with reasonable notice of, and an 
opportunity to oppose, the restrictive order’s issuance; thus, Jones’s due process rights were 
violated. Additionally, the court failed to create an adequate record for review or provide reasons 
for its conclusion that a restrictive order was necessary. Finally, the court failed to make 
substantive findings as to the frivolous or harassing nature of Jones’s actions, and the restrictive 
order was not narrowly drawn to address the problem encountered.  
Conclusion  
The district court did not follow the four-step analysis set forth in Jordan when 
determining whether to permanently restrict Jones’s right to access the court. Thus, because the 
restrictive order runs afoul of the applicable guidelines, the Court concluded “that the district 
court acted arbitrarily and capriciously in designating Jones a vexatious litigant and entering the 
restrictive order.” Therefore, this Court grants the petition. 
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